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1.   Introduction 
According to theory, international trade improves resource allocation, lowers prices for 
consumers and leads to a more efficient production. An open trade regime also 
encourages both the integration of the economy into the global system and imports of 
modern technology, which results in productivity improvements. Accordingly, 
international organizations advocate policy reforms centered on trade liberalization to 
foster growth and welfare. 
However, trade theory does not provide a full understanding of the possible links of 
trade openness with uncertainty and exposure to foreign shocks and their eventual long 
term effects on the welfare of partner countries. These issues are currently hotly debated 
by practitioners. The theoretical and applied trade literature on these issues is fuzzy and 
does not reach a common stance.  
Further investigation is needed to control for the presence of a true “vulnerability 
hazard” linked to trade openness.
i
Assessing vulnerability is not straightforward and there are several misconceptions 
relating to its analysis. Moreover, the link between vulnerability and trade has been 
rather overlooked. In an attempt to bridge the trade and vulnerability literature, this 
survey provides a comprehensive review of the studies on the “destabilizing effects” of 
 This requires an assessment of whether or not there 
are long term consequences of international trade such as: increasing exposure to 
external shocks; raising uncertainty about the future and/or greater stress on certain 
actors. Whether or not these consequences are more likely to emerge in the first stages 
of trade liberalization and/or particularly harmful for developing countries is also 
relevant.  3 
 
trade openness; that originates from different fields of analysis. It also provides a 
conceptualization of the vulnerability phenomenon- which is still at the “let a hundred 
flowers bloom" stage, as stated by Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003).  
This work contributes to the current debate on the effects of trade openness on 
developing countries by proposing guidelines about how to apply vulnerability analysis 
to the trade literature. In the end, it identifies three directions for future research.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on the likely 
“destabilizing effects” of trade openness. Section 3 reviews the current theoretical and 
applied literature on “vulnerability”, presenting an overall conceptualization of the 
phenomenon as well as some of the most common misconceptions. Section 4 proposes 
a conceptualization of the trade and vulnerability “link” and some directions for future 
research. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Is trade openness “destabilizing” for developing countries? 
Most empirical work establishes a consistent and significant positive correlation 
between trade liberalization, growth and poverty reduction (Edwards, 1993; Frankel & 
Romer, 1999; Sachs & Warner, 1995, Dollar & Kraay, 2001, 2002, Cline, 2004; 
Winters, 2004). The drawbacks to trade openness are acknowledged basically in terms 
of short and medium run adjustment costs. The pervasive effects of trade openness on 
poverty and inequality, even in the long run, are acknowledged as well (McCulloch & 
al., 2001; Lundberg & Squire, 2003; Winters & al., 2004; Goldberg & Pavcnik 2004).  
An issue belittled by the above literature concerns the possible link between trade and 
the excessive fluctuation of the main aggregate variables, a phenomenon that is 
increasing over time for a high fraction of low and middle income countries (Agenor & 4 
 
al., 2000; Kose & al., 2003; Wolf 2004b). The hypothesis of a direct link between 
developing countries’ instability and trade openness has several roots: i) the apparent 
asymmetry between the process of increasing specialization and the presence of 
random, undiversifiable shocks in the export markets of open economies (Razin & 
Rose, 1992; Koren & Tenreyro, 2007); ii) the tendency of commodity prices – which 
are at the core of the specialization process in developing countries – to be more 
volatile than those of manufacture goods (Malik & Temple, 2009); iii) the inconsistency 
between the shocks prevailing in open markets and traditional coping mechanisms and 
local market structures (Dercon, 2001); iv) the occurrence of boom–bust cycles of 
investment induced by trade openness in countries characterized by inadequate 
infrastructures and shortages of skilled labor (Razin & al. 2003); v) the role of trade 
liberalization in altering households’ optimal portfolios, coupled with greater variability 
in new portfolio options (Winters & al., 2004); and vi) higher risk of policy 
mismanagement in response to an entirely new set of incentives induced by trade 
openness in contexts where political institutions are weak (Gavin & Hausmann, 1996; 
Rodrik, 1999, Acemoglu & al., 2003, Fatás & Mihov, 2003, 2005).  
While the literature often refers to “volatility” and “shocks” as if they were a sole 
subject of analysis, it is necessary to acknowledge that “volatility” relates mainly to 
uncertainty
ii, while “shocks” and “sudden stops”
iii are actually manifestations of risks
iv 
and are likely to have differential impacts on country’s welfare. In the case of 
uncertainty, we are referring to a long term phenomenon which hampers the correct 
functioning of markets, likely producing an impact on consumption. In the case of 
shocks (or crises), these are short term episodes of economic downturn characterized by 5 
 
likely pervasive and long term incidences of poverty and well-being. Aizenman & Pinto 
(2004) introduce the notion of “crisis volatility” to stress that the unpredictable 
component of total observed volatility is more closer to a “pure risk”. Dehn (2000), 
who tests separately the effects of uncertainty and shocks on commodity prices in 
developing countries, confirms the two effects should be kept separately: while large, 
discrete, negative commodity price “shocks” have large, highly significant and negative 
effects on per capita growth,
v commodity price “uncertainty” does not affect growth.
vi
As a result, most of the empirical works that emphasize the role of trade openness as a 
key determinant of uncertainty are grounded in the literature on aggregate volatility 
(Easterly & al., 1993; Mendoza, 1995; Gavin & Hausmann, 1996; Prasad & Gable, 
1998; Rodrik, 1998; Kose, 2002; Kose & Yi, 2001, 2006; Wolf, 2004a; Kose & al., 
2005); while investigation of the links between trade openness and shocks is usually 
tackled as a complementary, real aspect in the empirical literature on currency crises 
(Milesi-Ferretti & Razin, 1998, 2000), underlining the role of international trade in 
triggering “sudden stops” (Cavallo & Frankel, 2008), or as a vehicle to spread out 
crises, especially in regional contexts (Glick & Rose, 1999; Easterly & Kraay, 1999; 
Forbes, 2001).  
  
The empirical results from the first strand of literature are mixed. While some studies 
find that an increase in the degree of trade openness leads to higher output volatility, 
especially in developing countries (Karras & Song, 1996; Easterly & al., 2001; Kose & 
al., 2003;; Di Giovanni & Levchenko, 2006; Raddatz, 2007; Loayza & Raddatz, 2007; 
Krishna & Levchenko, 2009), others find no significant relationship between an 
increased degree of trade interdependence and domestic macroeconomic volatility 6 
 
(Calderòn & al., 2005; Kose & Yi, 2006; Cavallo, 2007) or just a temporary 
relationship (Santos-Paulino, 2007). A separate but related issue is the role of 
international trade as a key determinant of business cycle transmission across countries 
(Anderson & al., 1999; Canova & Dellas, 1993; Clark & van Wincoop, 2001; Otto & 
al., 2001; Calderon & al., 2002; Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2004; Imbs, 2004; Kose & Yi, 
2001, 2006). This is consistent, theoretically, with the international “Real Business 
Cycle” (RBC) approach as it embodies demand and supply side spill-over channels 
(Stadler, 1994). However, Kose & Yi (2001, 2006), who try to match RBC and the co-
movements in their empirical findings, are not able to explain its magnitude, and 
suggest the existence of a “trade–co-movement puzzle”.  
In the second strand of the literature, the role of trade openness in fostering 
macroeconomic crises is also hotly debated.
vii The basic argument for a positive role of 
trade openness in reducing exposure to foreign shocks is that a high trade/GDP ratio 
helps to adjust to a cut-off in international financing. Rose (2005) provides empirical 
explanations for the above case, arguing that countries with higher trade/GDP ratios are 
less likely to default because investors are less likely to pull out, and that higher ratios 
of trade to GDP allow countries to cope with a cut-off of capital inflow and a smaller 
percentage increase in exports. Cavallo & Frankel (2008) show that trade openness 
makes countries less vulnerable to both severe sudden stops and currency crashes, and 
show that this relationship is even stronger when correcting for the endogeneity of 
trade, using “gravity estimates”
viii. On the other hand, the basic argument for a 
pervasive role of trade openness in increasing exposure to external shocks, is grounded 
in the idea that a weakening export performance can trigger a sudden stop in capital 7 
 
flows. Furthermore, Eichengreen & Rose (1999), Glick & Rose (1999) and Forbes 
(2001) demonstrate empirically the role of “trade linkages” in spreading crises in 
regions. The central point here is that currency crises spread along the lines of trade 
linkages
ix and, since trade patterns are strongly negatively affected by distance, - no 
matter who is the “first victim” of a speculative attack, or what factors are behind it - 
there is strong evidence that currency crises tend to spread regionally because of trade 
linkages.
x
3.  From exposure to shock and uncertainty to a “vulnerability analysis”: 
conceptualization, measurement and common misbeliefs 
  
Before going deeper into the “trade and vulnerability link”, it is worth providing 
additional details on the vulnerability phenomenon, in terms of theoretical 
conceptualization and empirical application, and proposing a differential analysis with 
similar phenomena that avoids falling into some common misconceptions.  
3.1 Vulnerability or vulnerabilities? 
As Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003) underline, vulnerability means different things to 
different people. It is a complex phenomenon, not easily determined by one measurable 
factor. It can be rightly compared to a picture in a newspaper. Looked at from a 
distance, it may seem clear and relatively sharp. However, viewed close up, it appears 
blurred and grainy and loses its sharpness. Likewise, there is a wide consensus on what 
vulnerability means in general terms; but, when we attempt to analyze it in detail, the 
concept tends to blur and become subsumed in the haze of the multifarious situations of 
vulnerability, giving only context-specific interpretations. As a result, a proliferation of 
methodologies, terminology and approaches to vulnerability analysis have been applied 8 
 
within a broad range of topics (e.g. food security, natural disasters, conflict prevention, 
economic fragility, etc.). Scholars, research centers, multilateral and bilateral 
organizations and agencies have developed their own definitions and methods to 
analyze vulnerability.
xi It is notable that not all these definitions include the same key 
elements and they also use slightly different terminology.
xii
An attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of vulnerability has been carried out 
by the World Bank, in its “Social Risk Management” (SRM) approach (Holzmann, 
2001; Holzmann & Jørgensen, 2001; Heitzmann & al., 2001).
 Hence, practitioners from 
different disciplines use different meanings and concepts of vulnerability, which tend to 
be theoretically strong and empirically weak, or vice versa (Alwang & al., 2001).  
xiii The SRM approach is 
partly an extension of the literature on poverty dynamics, where the traditional 
distinction between chronic and transient poverty is enhanced by a forward-looking 
approach. According to this approach (see Heitzmann & al., 2001), the three basic 
components of vulnerability analysis are the following: a thorough analysis of risks (i.e. 
the exogenous side)
xiv; an assessment of the degree of resilience and/or 
responsiveness
xv (i.e. the endogenous side); a benchmark (i.e. a socially accepted 
minimum norm for each outcome under which households is said to be vulnerable to 
future loss)
xvi. Another prominent approach to vulnerability is the “Sustainable 
Livelihood Vulnerability” (SLV) adopted by many international development agencies, 
such as UNDP, DFID, IDS, Oxfam, CARE, to produce project appraisals and reviews 
(see Carney &. al., 1999). The SLV approach is linked to Sen’s seminal “capabilities 
approach” which stresses what people can do or be, based on their entitlements. 
Accordingly, SLV assesses vulnerability as the likelihood that people's livelihoods 9 
 
deteriorate over time, and analyses the dynamics and characteristics of the population's 
reaction strategies in various political and socio-economic contexts (Barrientos, 2007; 
UNDP, 2000; Singh & Gilman, 1999). It incorporates an evaluation of sensitivity to 
negative shocks (“livelihood sensitivity”) as well as the endogenous ability to respond 
and recover (“livelihood resilience”).
xvii
3.2 Measuring vulnerability: a taxonomy  
  
Different approaches to defining vulnerability lead to differences in methods of 
estimation. The most common methods to measure vulnerability are monetary and 
typically express welfare in terms of consumption. Consumption variability is in fact 
considered as a better measure of risk than income volatility since the consumption of 
an optimizing household changes only in response to unexpected changes in income 
(Dynan, 1993). While the earliest efforts attempt to measure vulnerability simply as the 
household’s exposure to a set of observed risks - the so called VER (vulnerability 
exposure to risk) approach – (Glewwe & Hall, 1998; Amin & al., 1999, Dercon & 
Krishnan, 2000) – later efforts measure vulnerability as “expected welfare” under 
“uncertainty” (Chaudhuri, 2001, 2003; Ligon & Schechter, 2003; Calvo & Dercon, 
2007). A taxonomy of the main methods applied in vulnerability analysis is provided by 
Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003). A slight update to this identifies three typologies of 
vulnerability measures:  
−  VEP-Vulnerability to Expected Poverty (Christiaensen & Boisvert, 2000; 
Christiaensen & Subbarao, 2001; Chaudhuri, 2001, 2003; Chaudhuri & al., 2002; 
Pritchett & al., 2000). This is the most commonly applied method. It assesses 10 
 
vulnerability as the expected value of the standard FGT class of decomposable 
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where z is a constant consumption poverty line; I(.) is an indicator function that 
equals 1 if the household consumption is below the poverty line and zero otherwise, 
and the parameter α sets the degree of sensitivity of the vulnerability measure to the 
distance from the poverty line. The standard VEP measure is the expected poverty 
headcount (assuming α=0), which however does not take into account the incidence 
and severity of poverty.
xix
On the assumption that consumption is log-normally distributed, setting the 
consumption poverty threshold, z and a threshold probability value above which a 
household is considered vulnerable, it is possible to estimate the probability of a 
household with characteristics Xh to fall below the poverty line using the estimated 
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where Φ is the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution. The main 
advantage of the VEP method is that it can be used to assess vulnerability with a 
single round of cross-sectional data, particularly convenient in the absence of panel 
data, which is the case for most developing countries. The VEP model assumes that 
the variance of the residuals in cross-sectional consumption regressions (i.e. the 11 
 
unexplained part of household consumption) is not simply a measurement error and 
is not equal across households, but captures the impact of both idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks on consumption, that can be explained by a set of observable 
household characteristics.
xxiii
xx The model relies on the strong assumption that cross-
sectional variability also proxies inter-temporal variance in consumption. Hence, it 
misses the impact of household-invariant but time-variant shocks. Notwithstanding 
its empirical advantages, the  standard VEP model has some additional limitations. 
Firstly, it lacks a solid theoretical background: it relies on the strong assumption of 
stationary time series and assumes further that the distribution of shocks to 
consumption is independent normal.
xxi Secondly, it implies that households have 
increasing absolute risk aversion, which contrasts to the empirical evidence on the 
risk preferences of the poor (Ligon & Schechter, 2004). Furthermore, it displays a 
somewhat perverse feature relating to the measure of the welfare consequences of 
risks, since it implies a reduction of vulnerability by increasing the variability of 
consumption around the poverty line, which again is in sharp contrast to the poor 
being risk averse (Hoddinott & Quisumbing, 2003).
xxii Finally, this model is not 
suited to differentiating between unexplained variance at household level (i.e. the 
impact of idiosyncratic shocks) and unexplained variance at community level (i.e. 
the impact of covariate shocks).  
−  VEU - Vulnerability as Low Expected Utility (Ligon & Schechter 2003, 2004). The 
VEU model tries to counteract some of the weaknesses of the VEP class of 
measures by proposing a measure of vulnerability based on “expected utility”. The 
vulnerability of household h is thus measured as the difference between the utility 
 12 
 
derived from some level of certainty-equivalent consumption, zce (above which the 
household would not be considered vulnerable; something analogous to a poverty 
line),
xxiv
) ( ) ( h h ce h h c EU z U V − =
 and the expected utility of consumption, as follows:   
 
where Uh is a weakly concave, strictly increasing function.  
The VEU method enables decomposition of vulnerability into two distinct 
components: “vulnerability to poverty”, that is, low expected consumption, and 
“vulnerability to risk”, that is, high volatility of consumption, by taking account of 
expectations of an increasing, concave function of consumption expenditures 
Uh(Ech) as follows
xxv
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where the first bracketed term (i.e. the difference in utility at zce compared to the 
utility of households’ expected consumption)
xxvii
xxvi is the measure of “vulnerability to 
poverty” and involves no random variables, while the second term, according to the 
ordinal measures of risk proposed by Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970), measures 
“vulnerability to risk”.  
) ( t h x c E
The risk component can be further decomposed into 
covariate and idiosyncratic components. Let  be the expected value of 
consumption conditional on a vector of covariant variables xt, then we can rewrite 
the VEU measure as follows:  
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where the first bracketed component is again vulnerability to poverty, but the 
second and third components break down vulnerability to risk into two 
subcomponents: vulnerability to covariate risks and vulnerability to idiosyncratic 
risks. To avoid confusion between the measurement error and idiosyncratic risk, 
Ligon & Schechter (2003) further decompose their measure of idiosyncratic risk 
into risk that can be attributed to a set of distinct, observed, time varying 
characteristics. 
The VEU measure of vulnerability raises three main and interrelated concerns: 
firstly, the obvious circumstance that the choice of the particular functional form of 
the utility function directly affects the magnitude of the phenomenon; secondly, the 
difficulty to transform VEU measures of vulnerability, in units of utility, into actual 
economic policy targets (Hoddinott & Quisumbing, 2003); thirdly, it is sensitive 
overall to ex ante changes in welfare, even those above the poverty line that have 
no direct incidence on future poverty (Calvo & Dercon, 2007).  
−  VFP - Vulnerability as Threat of Future Poverty (Calvo & Dercon, 2003, 2005, 
2007). VFP assesses vulnerability as “the burden of the threat of future poverty” 
and tries to avoid some of weakness of both VEP and VEU. Starting from the 
assumption that people suffer and are wary of the future if their knowledge of what 
it holds is uncertain, Calvo & Dercon (2007) picture the desirable properties of the 
vulnerability measure by proposing the following set of axioms. The focus axiom 
(i.e. the vulnerability measure cannot be affected by outcome changes above the 
poverty line); symmetry over states (i.e. the only relevant difference between two 14 
 
states of the world i and j is the difference in their outcomes and probabilities); 
continuity and differentiability (of the vulnerability function); scale invariance (i.e. 
vulnerability measure should not depend on the unit of the measure of outcomes); 
normalization (i.e. to impose boundaries for reasons of comparability); probability-
dependent effect of outcomes (i.e. vulnerability is sensitive to the likelihood of that 
particular state of the world); probability transfer (i.e. vulnerability cannot increase 
as a result of a probability transfer from state j to state i); risk sensitivity (i.e. greater 
risk increases vulnerability); constant relative risk sensitivity (i.e. risk sensitivity 
remains constant if all state specific outcomes increase proportionally). If all the 
above axioms are satisfied, the following vulnerability measure applies: 
] [ 1
a
a x E V − =  with 0<α<1  
where 0<x<1 and represents the “rate of coverage of basic needs”, which is 
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consumption level (after all consumption smoothing efforts have been deployed); z 
is the standard poverty line; and a represents “risk sensitivity” (as a increases to 1, 
household approaches risk-neutrality). It follows then, that vulnerability is equal to 
the probability of being poor only if outcomes are expected to be zero in every state 
of the world where the individual is poor. In this respect, the VFP measure 
complements VEP, which, according to this view, risks to overestimate 
vulnerability. Furthermore, with the introduction of the minimum operator and the 
“focus axiom”, the VFP measure complements also VEU.  15 
 
Two main caveats apply to use of the VFP measure. Firstly, it follows from the 
definition above that for those facing no uncertainty with known xi=x*<1, for all i, 
Va>0; that is, they must be considered vulnerable with certainty. In other words, 
being poor is the dominant threat in terms of vulnerability. However, there is no 
agreement on this reasoning in the literature. Moreover, there is also a “risk” of a 
spurious correlation between poverty and vulnerability. Secondly, this generous 
method of building an “axiomatic approach” to vulnerability needs to be 
compounded with wide and robust empirical analyses capable of providing clear 
added value to standard VEP outcomes. Finally, it should be borne in mind that 
there is a trade off between more accurate vulnerability estimates and the vast 
amounts of data required on all possible states of the world.   
In sum, each vulnerability method presents its own virtues and weaknesses. They share 
some commonalities as well. First, they all focus on households, no matter what the 
typology (from handmade macroeconomic policy to natural disasters, e.g. rainfall, etc.) 
and nature (covariate and idiosyncratic) of the observable shocks. Second, they all make 
reference to a welfare indicator as a benchmark; they assume its expected value to be 
linked to household characteristics and its variance to uncertainty or the impact of 
shocks coupled with coping mechanisms.
xxviii Third, they generally adopt a two step 
procedure of estimating the distribution of future consumption expenditures for every 
household and then constructing a statistic to capture the reduction in welfare due to 
shocks in household consumption expenditures.
xxix And finally, they all derive 
aggregate measures of vulnerability essentially by summing household vulnerability 
across all households.
xxx Ligon & Schechter (2004) conducted Monte Carlo 16 
 
experiments designed to explore the performance of different estimators using these 
vulnerability measures, under different assumptions regarding the economic 
environment
xxxii. If the vulnerability measure is 
xxxi. They find that all measures show high correlation and that the three 
approaches perform best in different environments. More specifically, when the 
environment is stationary and consumption expenditures are measured without error, 
the best estimator is that proposed by Chaudhuri (2001), whatever vulnerability 
measure is employed risk
3.3 The most common misconceptions about vulnerability 
-sensitive and consumption 
is measured with error, then the estimators proposed by Ligon & Schechter (2003) and 
Calvo & Dercon (2003) generally perform best. Finally, if the distribution of 
consumption is non-stationary, a modification of the Chaudhuri (2001) estimator 
applied to panel data in differences proposed by Pritchett & al. (2000) performs best.  
Notwithstanding the amount of analytical and empirical work on the topic of 
vulnerability, its analysis is still affected by several misconceptions. First, most 
analyses liken vulnerability to ex-post poverty. Although interconnected, these two 
concepts are different. They can be seen as two sides of the same coin. The observed 
poverty status of a household is the ex-post realization of a state, whereas vulnerability 
is its ex-ante probability (Chaudhuri & al., 2002). Some recent studies on the dynamics 
of poverty find that most poverty is temporary in nature (Baulch & Hoddinott, 
2000).
xxxiii Standard poverty assessments deal with the above evidence trying to 
separate transient and chronic poverty, and provide information on “how often” a 
household is poor; vulnerability analyses deal with it distinguish between those who are 
vulnerable due to low expected mean consumption (i.e. low endowment) and those who 17 
 
are vulnerable due to high volatility of consumption (i.e. high uninsured income 
fluctuations). This provides an answer to the question of “why the poor are poor” 
(Chaudhuri & Datt, 2001). It follows that if we are interested in getting additional 
information on the dynamic of poverty, vulnerability analysis is extremely useful. 
Moreover, if the characteristics of the “vulnerable” differ significantly from those of the 
poor, targeting only the latter will exclude a significant group of households that are at 
risk of a decline in living standards. In other words, the distinction between poverty and 
vulnerability remains key for economic policy.  
An additional related issue concerns the links between vulnerability and poverty. There 
is a widespread idea that the poor will be among the most vulnerable people. As Calvo 
& Dercon (2007) point out, if vulnerability is about the threat of poverty, then being 
poor will be the dominant threat. Moreover, according to the World Bank (2000) the 
poor are the most exposed to a wider array of risks, that is, they “are often among the 
most vulnerable in society”. Their low income means they are less able to save and 
accumulate assets. This, in turn, reduces their ability to deal with shocks when they 
occur, forces them to smooth productive assets to preserve their likelihood, and can 
result in a structural inability to escape poverty in the future (Jalan & Ravaillon, 1999, 
Zimmerman & Carter, 2003; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter & al., 2007).
xxxiv However, 
the issue of the relative incidence of shocks according to the welfare position of the 
household remains tricky. There is a “risk” of a spurious correlation between poverty 
and vulnerability, since those households that suffer an income or wealth loss are likely 
to be at the lower end of the income distribution. Tesliuc & Lindert (2004), in a study of 
Guatemala, suggest, for instance, that shocks occur everywhere along the distribution 18 
 
and affect poor and non-poor households alike.
xxxv
Another distinctive feature of vulnerability analysis that is worth bearing in mind, 
concerns precisely the above distinction between “adaptability” or “resilience”, and 
“coping capacity” and “responsiveness”. Notwithstanding their obvious 
interconnection, these are two different concepts not a single one as is often assumed in 
the literature. The term “resilience” refers to “the capacity of a system, community or 
society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to 
reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure” (UN/ISDR, 2004). 
“Responsiveness”, on the other hand, measures the availability of policy tools and 
institutions to cope with, mitigate or avoid the negative effects of external shocks. In 
the first case, we are dealing with a structural phenomenon given by the complex of 
individual actions undertaken collectively mainly by private agents, to cope with, 
mitigate or avoid the negative effects of external shocks. These actions will depend 
strongly on assets, and levels of education and health and open the way to new 
conceptual developments - for instance, in the recent debate on adaptation to “climate 
change”. In the second case, we are dealing with policies and institutions capable of 
strengthening or reducing a country’s ability to cope and/or recover from negative 
shocks. This distinction has been enhanced at the macro level, by separating the issue of 
“structural vulnerability” which results from endogenous factors that are independent of 
a country’s current political will, from the issue of “policy vulnerability” which is 
 They highlight however that the 
poor are more exposed to natural shocks (but less exposed to “man made” ones), show 
a lower degree of resilience and rely on coping strategies that damage their growth 
prospects.    19 
 
linked to a country’s political choices or, even more clearly, from the issue of “state 
fragility” which relates to countries characterized by very low policy scores (Naudé & 
al., 2009; Guillamont, 2007, 2009). A similar distinction is been in the “sustainable 
livelihood” approach, between “coping strategies”, defined as short-term responses to 
specific shocks, and “adaptive strategies”, or those that entail longer-term changes in 
behavior as a result of shocks or stress. Note that, a greater capacity to cope usually 
builds resilience, and vice versa. 
It should be acknowledged also that experiencing an ex-post welfare loss is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the classification of vulnerable. Vulnerability is an ex-ante 
condition that only potentially may lead to negative outcomes. Therefore, vulnerability 
cannot be directly observed, but only predicted (Chaudhuri & al., 2001). Vulnerability 
measures cannot rely on observable data because vulnerability does not depend on, say, 
what consumption expenditures are actually realized, but rather on what they might be 
(Ligon & Schechter, 2004). Future consumption being uncertain, the estimation 
problem in vulnerability analysis generally involves the use of past realizations of 
consumption expenditures to estimate the probability of possible future consumption 
outcomes. This may be relatively easy if the environment is assumed to be stationary 
(probabilities remain the same across time). However, environments are not stationary 
in reality, and the probabilities associated with different consumption realizations vary 
over time (Ligon & Schechter, 2004). Since vulnerability is not observable, it needs not 
only a factual analysis (i.e. a forward looking measure from the observed facts) but also 
a counterfactual (i.e. another measure for a different world). For instance, the 
counterfactual for vulnerability measures based on consumption expenditure is the 20 
 
unobservable level of consumption that would have prevailed in the absence of shocks 
and/or uncertainty (Alwang & al., 2001). This is the most problematic issue in 
vulnerability analysis. As many empirical studies show, collecting data on a 
counterfactual is intrinsically challenging because individuals cannot easily or 
accurately quantify the extent/cost of welfare losses from shocks (Tesliuc & Lindert, 
2004). Hence, one should rely on indirect estimation methods. A number of methods 
have been applied so far, that are characterized by virtues and deficiencies as well, from 
simple augmented specifications of a typical consumption regression with shock 




 to an extensive application of the Oaxaca 
decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973)  or the use of non-parametric density estimations (Di 
Nardo & al., 1996).  
4.  Towards a “vulnerability to trade” analysis: three directions for future 
research 
Finally, as illustrated previously, without any benchmark, the 
term “vulnerability” is too imprecise to be practically useful. Every person in the world 
is in fact potentially subject to a decline in well being as the result of a negative shock. 
Monetary vulnerability measures, for instance, assess vulnerability as the risk of falling 
below a specific minimum consumption level, while the sustainable livelihood literature 
defines vulnerability with respect to a minimum livelihood level. Hence, vulnerability 
should be defined in terms of the potential to fall below a socially accepted minimums. 
Its measurement should thus include a cut-off or benchmark, which should be chosen 
with great care (Alwang & al., 2001).  
The hypothesis of a “vulnerability hazard” in developing countries – that is, a likely 
long term negative welfare effect of exposure to external shocks and uncertainty -  21 
 
induced by trade openness, is hotly debated (Montalbano & al., 2006, 2008; 
Guillaumont, 2007, 2009; Naudé & al., 2009a).
xxxix 
A number of considerations support the hypothesis of a trade and vulnerability link: 
Dercon (2001) underlines the role of openness as a vehicle for an entirely “new set” of 
shocks and incentives able to put traditional mechanisms under pressure and hamper 
people’s standard management strategies; Winters (2002) and Winters & al. (2004) 
suggest that trade openness could alter households’ optimal portfolios, thereby leading 
to sub-optimal choices, especially for the poor, because of their “poor” ability to bear 
“new risks”, and weak capabilities to insure themselves against adverse impacts; Calvo 
& Dercon (2007) and Ligon & Schechter (2004) highlight that risk averse behavior by 
households can be negatively affected by rising uncertainty, as in the case of ongoing 
trade reform.   
 
4.1 What is missing from current analyses  
Unfortunately, there is no clear and exact criterion against which to judge trade 
openness from the perspective of “risk exposure” and “vulnerability hazard”. At the 
same time, approaches that condemn any shocks that cause even one individual to 
suffer a reduction in income, will inevitably fail, given the wide heterogeneity of 
households and the strongly redistributed nature of trade shocks (Winters, 2002). A 
more detailed analysis of the welfare effects of trade openness is needed in order to 
achieve a better understanding of who are “the vulnerable” as well as a more accurate 
assessment of the costs - to risk averse households in an open environment - of choices 
that minimize expected poverty or maximize their expected utility.  22 
 
Despite the number of significant and useful studies that have been conducted in recent 
years to assess the pervasive incidence of trade openness on the economic performance 
of developing countries, we still do not have a comprehensive analysis of the likely 
effects of trade openness on vulnerability in developing countries. Current empirical 
works use numerous different methods and empirical instruments, and studies are 
separated across widely different fields of investigation which often do not 
communicate.
xl
Hence, additional efforts are needed to build a sound methodology to assess 
vulnerability to trade openness. To this end, some pre-requisites should be fulfilled and 
some refinements to the current literature on the effects of trade openness have to be 
done. First, we need to move from ex post assessments, based on aggregate volatility or 
crisis transmission, to build an ex ante measure of the likelihood and magnitude of 
experiencing a reduction in well-being as a result of trade openness (or the process of 
opening up). Second, we need to choose a suitable benchmark to distinguish actual 
vulnerability from normal variability. Third, since vulnerability is an “ex ante” 
condition and it is not observable, it requires a counterfactual analysis. Finally, since 
the data derived from household surveys are severely limited, we need a better 
accounting for the actual impacts of external shocks and specific evidence on “man-
 In addition, most of these investigations are ex post studies, targeted 
mainly at issues not directly linked to vulnerability. At the same time, we must 
acknowledge the limits of current vulnerability analyses, most of which are based on 
household surveys not designed to provide a full accounting of the actual impacts of 
shocks and, generally, focused on specific micro socio-economic contexts.  23 
 
made” shocks, such as those that derive from the management of economic policies in a 
globalised world (Dercon, 2001).  
As emphasized, there is no single methodology to assess vulnerability to trade 
openness. However, we can highlight three promising lines of research that might 
provide us with more adequate assessments of developing countries’ vulnerability to 
trade openness. They are related to three levels of analysis: macro, micro and meso. 
From a macro point of view the key challenge is to incorporate a forward looking 
approach to the standard macro literature on cross-country effects of trade openness; 
from a micro point of view the aim is to assess the impact of covariate and idiosyncratic 
shocks induced by trade openness at household level; at the meso level, the objective is 
to derive useful insights and a more comprehensive picture of the vulnerability to trade 
phenomenon by investigating the channels of transmission of external shocks at the 
subnational level. The first aspect of vulnerability highlights the pervasive and 
differentiated impact of covariate shocks that are of main interest for international 
economic policy. The second might help national policymakers to set priorities and 
calibrate domestic coping mechanisms and safety nets. The third sheds lights on the 
pervasive role of geography, regional, industry and competition polices.   
4.2 Vulnerability from trade: towards a macro approach  
Cross country investigations remain an essential component of vulnerability to trade 
analyses and benefit from a truly comparative approach. The need for a macro approach 
to vulnerability is grounded in the recognition that, in the context of international trade, 
covariate external shocks are increasingly and quantitatively important and are more 
likely to have a larger impact on welfare than idiosyncratic ones. These shocks, the 24 
 
result of a perverse combination of international turmoil and economic policy 
mismanagement, manifest themselves in various forms (e.g. public budget, balance of 
payments, currency and banking crises, hyperinflation) and primarily affect
xli
Montalbano & al. (2006, 2008) and Federici & Montalbano (2010) provide a first effort 
to address the issue of vulnerability to trade covariate shocks in cross-country 
comparisons. Following a broader definition of vulnerability to trade openness than 
simply “vulnerability to poverty because of trade openness” (Naudé & al., 2009b), 
recalling Hnatkovska & Loayza’s (2004) decomposition method to derive the notion of 
“extreme volatility” as a proxy for “perturbation”, provide a sound method and a first 
empirical cross-country test for vulnerability to trade openness. Montalbano & al. 
(2006, 2008) conduct a vulnerability analysis of the controversial case of the impacts of 
trade liberalization on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of 
the CMEA.
 the 
countries that are most integrated in the world economy (Easterly & Kraay 1999). A 
second reason for a macro approach is related to policy. Recent events highlight the 
paucity of ex ante international macroeconomic policies capable of properly 
recognizing and coping with the systemic nature of macroeconomic crises and their 
actual effects.  
xlii Federici & Montalbano (2010) highlight a robust and significant long 
term relationship, for a large sample of countries, between trade openness, the “extreme 
volatility” of consumption (crisis and boom) and the deviation in consumption growth 
from the expected path. The intuition behind both models is that vulnerable countries 
should be characterized, ceteris paribus, by a higher probability to be harmed by 
covariate shocks in an open environment, with long run consequences in terms of 25 
 
welfare. These empirical tests show that vulnerability is a compound outcome not 
necessarily related to simple variability in the terms-of-trade and/or other aggregate 
variables linked to trade openness. Furthermore, they demonstrate that a positive 
association between trade openness and growth can actually hinder the presence of 
permanent “consumption gaps” between observed consumption growth and its 
“expected path”, induced by “perturbations” linked to trade openness. Additional work 
is needed to provide a more comprehensive method to assess, at the aggregate level, 
vulnerability to trade openness. However, the above analyses are definitively a first step 
towards a new direction for future research.  
4.3 Addressing vulnerability to trade at the household level  
A macro approach to vulnerability to trade encompasses the limitations of standard 
cross-section analyses. Moreover, it focuses on aggregate variables and thus deals only 
with covariant macro shocks at country level (i.e. shocks affecting the variables on 
average), without taking account of the differences in observable household 
characteristics and income distributions. As already underlined, vulnerability 
assessments may differ across social groups within countries, while the relative income 
positions of households are likely to have important effects on their ability to access 
adequate tools and coping mechanisms, as underlined by a number of vulnerability 
analyses. 
Trade openness is key to assessing vulnerability at household level. International trade 
affects the risks faced by households in two ways: by changing the riskiness of existing 
activities, for instance, by altering the weight of foreign relative to domestic shocks 
faced by the economy, and by changing the emphasis among the different activities 26 
 
they engage in, for instance, switching from subsistence food crop to cash crops 
(McCulloch & al. 2001). However, empirical evidence shows that poorer households 
may be less able than richer ones to protect themselves against the adverse effects of 
“man made” external shocks or to take advantage of the positive opportunities created 
by policy reforms (Tesliuc & Lindert, 2004). This may explain the unwillingness of 
some households to pursue high average returns linked to the different activities opened 
up by trade reforms (see Morduch, 1994). Thus, they suffer the costs of trade reforms 
without reaping any compensating benefits in the form of higher average earnings. In 
this respect, the pervasive effect of trade openness in constraining households’ optimal 
portfolios is underlined. Exposing people to external shocks that generate uncertainty 
could result in a chronic inability to undertake “ex ante” potentially profitable new 
activities due to risk averseness, with likely negative effects in the long run (Winters, 
2002; Winters & al., 2004; Calvo & Dercon, 2007). This issue, though very relevant, 
has been largely overlooked by trade empirical literature. It implies the capacity to 
measure the cost and the probability of changes in households’ behavior induced by risk 
exposure and uncertainty linked to the trade reform process. From the point of view of 
the factual analysis, standard literature sees consumption smoothing as a primary 
behavioral objective. However, other strands of the literature underline the existence of 
constrained circumstances that may lead individuals to depart from consumption 
smoothing. The “dynamic asset-based approach to poverty” (Zimmerman & Carter, 
2003; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter & al., 2007) highlights that poorer agents respond 
to shocks by smoothing productive assets, hence destabilizing consumption and dipping 
to a poverty trap. Caroll (2001) observes the precautionary savings motive can generate 27 
 
a behavior that is virtually indistinguishable from that generated by a liquidity 
constraints, by essentially inducing self-imposed reluctance to borrow. Lee & Sawada 
(2010) demonstrate that the introduction of a liquidity constraint in presence of 
precautionary savings might negatively affect the behavior of the poor, by preventing 
them to raise the optimal amount of savings. Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1993) and 
Townsend (1994, 1995) investigate the role of different risk coping strategies in 
different socio-economic contexts and underline a number of salient features on the 
actual households’ ability to smooth consumption. A counterfactual analysis should be 
able to measure instead the expected level of consumption expenditure in the absence of 
uncertainty, net of the mean effects generated by trade. 
A useful attempt to provide an overall assessment of trade reforms on household 
welfare at the micro level, was conducted by Niimi & al. (2007). Adopting Glewwe & 
al.’s (2000), Justino & Litchfield’s (2002) and Winters’ (2002) conceptual framework, 
Niimi & al. (2007) analyze the impact of the “doi moi” reform process in Vietnam 
through three channels: prices, employment and wages, and fiscal policies. They 
provide robust empirical evidence that trade reforms have actually contributed to 
reducing poverty in Vietnam.
xliii 
4.4 Adding the “meso” level to vulnerability to trade analysis   
We still do not know, however, whether the process of 
opening up the Vietnamese economy has also had an identifiable impact on people’s 
behavior, and long term effects on their welfare, by increasing their degree of 
uncertainty towards the future and/or their exposure to risk.  
The need to enrich vulnerability analysis with a “meso” perspective emanates from the 
consciousness that neither cross country nor household vulnerability assessments, 28 
 
although characterized by relevant virtues, can guarantee adequate knowledge of the 
overall, long term welfare analysis of the risks induced by trade liberalization. A meso 
approach is thus required to compound the outcomes of cross-country vulnerability 
analyses with those at household level in “within country” approaches. The “meso 
approach” of vulnerability is  a totally new - and promising – approach that attracts a 
growing interest among practitioners. Up to now, it is possible to identify basically two 
main strands of the literature devoted to the meso approach: the “vulnerability of 
subnational regions approach”, which underlines the role of regional-level shocks as a 
source of covariate risk to households’ income and stresses fragility in various domains, 
such as economic fragility, fragility of ecosystems and fragility related to governance 
and local institutions; and the “industry level volatility approach”, which starts from the 
assumptions that the analysis of volatility across industries and a closer look at 
production sector are key to an deep investigation of the impact of shocks on poverty.  
Frontrunners of the first strand of the literature, also called “vulnerability of place” (i.e. 
the vulnerability of people to fall into or remain in poverty owing to being at a 
particular place) are Naudé, McGillivray, & Rossouw (2009) that provide an example 
of a Local Vulnerability Index (LVI) by using data from South Africa on 10 
vulnerability domains across the country’s 354 magisterial districts. They conclude that 
remoteness, dominance of primary (agricultural) production in a local economy, and 
low population densities are the dominant features of the most vulnerable subnational 
districts. Also Günther & Harttgen (2009) present a method to differentiate the relative 
importance of covariate shocks at “community level” (i.e. geographically clustered) 
with idiosyncratic shocks at household level. Starting from the traditional VEP method 29 
 
and using a multilevel analysis (Goldstein, 1999), they provide a suitable way to 
decompose the unexplained variance of consumption into a household and a 
“community” component, presenting a robust assessment of the relative impact of 
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks and providing asymptotically efficient and consistent 
estimation parameters.
xliv
Proponents of the “industry level approach” are Imbs (2004), Montalbano & al. (2005), 
di Giovanni & Levchenko (2006) and Krishna & Levchenko (2009). Imbs (2004) 
proposes a possible solution to the macro trade co-movement puzzle (see Kose & Yi, 
2001, 2006), highlighting the role of intra-industry trade on business cycle 
synchronization. A striking feature of Imbs’s (2004) work is that growth and volatility 
are negatively correlated across countries, but are positively correlated across 
industries, since, arguably, at the “meso level” risks and return are positively correlated 
across industries. According to this empirical evidence, the negative association 
between macroeconomic volatility and long-run economic growth is supposed to be 
exacerbated in countries with poor institutions, undergoing intermediate stages of 
financial development or unable to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies (Aizenman & 
Pinto, 2004). Montalbano & al. (2005) highlight a spread phenomenon of trade de-
specialization in some relevant “tradable” manufacturing industries in the Moroccan 
economy and relate this with episodes of “extreme volatility” of industries’ outputs 
linked to the euro-Mediterranean trade integration process. Di Giovanni & Levchenko 
(2006), using a broad, industry-level panel dataset of manufacturing production and 
trade (59 countries and 28 manufacturing sectors over a period of 30 years), provide an 
in depth analysis of the mechanisms through which trade affects volatility across 
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industries and on a wider set of outcome variables than aggregate GDP and 
consumption, for example, employment, salaries and prices at industry level. By 
including country fixed effects, they confirm Imbs’s (2004) results on the apparent 
differences between country-level and industry-level growth-volatility relationships. 
They highlight also that the more open that industries tend to be, ceteris paribus, the 
more volatile (since they are more exposed to world supply and demand shocks) they 
are
xlv and the less correlated to the rest of the economy (since they depend more on 
global shocks and less on the domestic cycle - Kraay & Ventura 2007). The net effect is 
a reduction in aggregate volatility together with a pervasive role of trade openness on 
volatility at the “meso” or industry level. Di Giovanni & Levchenko’s results are quite 
robust for all volatility measures considered, over different sized panels, and to the 
inclusion of several different fixed effects. Krishna & Levchenko (2009) provide 
theoretical explanations of Koren & Tenreyro’s (2007) hypothesis that developing 
countries are more volatile because their production specializations are in more volatile 
sectors. They find that less developed countries with low levels of human capital or 
with lower institutional ability, tend to specialize in less complex goods (i.e. that 
require fewer inputs for the production of one unit of the good), which are characterized 
by higher levels of output volatility. This last is a somewhat surprising feature. Their 
argument is that the volatility of a good that uses only a few inputs will be more 
affected by the shocks to each individual input, while production in a sector that uses 
numerous inputs will be less affected, on average, by shocks to any particular input (see 
also Koren & Tenreyro, 2008). Of course, we are still far from a comprehensive 31 
 
analysis of “meso” vulnerability. However, we already got very useful, although still 
scattered, contributions.   
5.  Conclusions 
It is still uncertain whether - and eventually to what extent - current trade reforms imply 
long term welfare discounting for some countries or households by raising their 
uncertainty about the future and/or their “risk exposure” to a new set of external shocks. 
However, it warrants more careful investigation of this issue. 
The literature review presented here highlights the amount and extent of the work and 
information currently available on this topic and also the urgent need for more detailed 
work in order to provide a better understanding of the implications of trade openness in 
terms of vulnerability. The present work provides useful insights into the current debate 
on the destabilizing effects of trade openness for developing countries, and some 
promising lines of reasoning for future research on the link between trade and 
vulnerability. One of the main difficulties lies in the need to bring together disparate 
pieces of knowledge. The added value of the present work is to reassemble within a 
single framework these different fields of investigation and get a comprehensive 
conceptualization of “vulnerability to trade openness”. The ultimate aim is to achieve a 
common method of assessing whether or not a “vulnerability hazard” can be induced by 
the process of trade liberalization that is currently ongoing. To this end, the paper 
highlights three directions for future research within three levels of analysis: macro, 
micro and meso. Improving our capacity to assess the “vulnerability hazard” of 
different trade reform options, at different levels of analysis, has evident policy 
implications. Evaluation of the impact of covariate shocks induced by trade openness is 32 
 
of major interest to international economic policy; assessment of idiosyncratic shocks 
will help national policymakers to set priorities and calibrate domestic coping 
mechanisms and safety nets; the “meso” analysis sheds lights on the economic 
geography and socio-political determinants at the local level as well as the role of 
industrial and competition polices.  
                                                 
i This work will not specifically address the long standing debate on the relative measures of trade 
liberalization and openness. It builds on McCulloch & al.’s (2001) views that the relative openness of 
countries depends largely on the extent to which international trade determines local prices, regardless of 
whether or not this depends mainly on deliberate policies. For a comprehensive list of standard measures 
of trade openness, see McCulloch & al. (2001). 
ii The phenomenon of aggregate volatility has been confined in standard cycle theory for a long time, 
mainly concerned in the decomposition of economic growth into cyclical and trend components. Thus, it 
has been long considered as a second-order issue in developing studies -  but of primary interest in 
industrial countries concerned with smoothing the fluctuations of their business cycles. It has been from 
the work of Ramey & Ramey (1995) onwards, that empirical cross-country studies have consistently 
found that volatility exerts a significant negative impact on long-run growth and welfare, especially in 
developing economies (Fatas, 2000; Pallage & Robe, 2003; Wolf, 2004a; Aizenman & Pinto, 2004) and 
that consumption volatility increases with respect to income (Kose & al. 2003). 
iii The expression “sudden stops” as a synonym for crisis was first used by Dornbusch & al., (1995).  
iv  While in the case of uncertainty several possible outcomes are associated with an event, but the 
assignment of probabilities to the outcomes is not possible, risk permits the assignment of probabilities to 
the different outcomes (Aizenman & Pinto, 2004)
  
v Positive shocks have no impact (Dehn, 2000). 
vi This result holds for 9 definitions of uncertainty from the “simple unconditional standard deviation” to 
“Garch’s conditional standard deviation of one step ahead forecast error dummying out all shocks” 
(Dehn, 2000). 
vii Frankel & Wei (2004) who attempted to model crisis probability using a key list of macroeconomic 
variables do not put trade at the top of the list of the determinants of “sudden stops”. They emphasize the 
role of corruption, inflationary policies with high budget deficits, and the composition of capital inflows. 
Actually, their results challenge a number of persisting “conventional wisdoms”, e.g. they find no clear 
evidence of a negative role of financial liberalization or intermediate floating exchange rate regimes: 
crises also appear to occur with hard pegs (Argentina), floating (Brazil after January 1999), and 
intermediate exchange rate regimes (Mexico, Thailand, Korea, Russia, Turkey).  
viii Guidotti & al. (2004) provide evidence that economies that trade more, recover more quickly from 
output contractions that usually accompany “sudden stops”. Calvo & al. (2003) and Edwards (2004) find 
that openness to trade is associated with fewer “sudden stops”. Martin & Rey (2006), using a general 
equilibrium model, show that emerging markets are more prone to financial crises unless openness in 
their financial accounting is counteracted by similar degrees of openness in trade.
 
ix The rationale for this evidence is that, in the presence of nominal rigidities, currency devaluation gives 
the country a temporary boost in terms of competitiveness, leaving its trade competitors likely to be the 
next to be attacked.
 
x The issue is analyzed in more depth by Forbes (2001), who, following Corsetti &  al. (2000) and 
Wincoop & Yi (2000), decomposes the “trade linkages” of crises into three parts: i) a competitiveness 
effect, linked to changes in relative prices that could hamper international competitiveness; ii) an income 33 
 
                                                                                                                                               
effect, i.e. reduction in the demand for imports induced by the income reduction following a crisis; iii) a 
cheap import effect, which, by contrast, is a positive supply shock connected to a reduction in import 
prices by trading partners forced to devaluate. Analyzing data on trade flows for a sample of countries 
that experienced a crisis in the 1990s, Forbes (2001) suggests that competitiveness and income effects are 
negative, significant and quantitatively relevant, while the positive cheap import effect remains weak. 
She highlights also the key role of countries’ different responses to the initial crisis in determining the 
prevalence of each effect, e.g. the competitiveness effect is larger in the face of a currency devaluation, 
while the income effect is linked to a rise in interest rates. 
xi For an extensive analysis of the methods and tools in international organization, see Montalbano & 
Triulzi (2002). 
xii For instance what USAID FEWS NET calls risk, is more commonly described as vulnerability to an 
undesired outcome, and what they refer to as vulnerability others call an analysis of household 
characteristics and risk response mechanisms. According to USAID, vulnerability is a condition that may 
lead to risk of food shortage (depending on the hazard), rather than the result of risk exposure and risk 
response mechanisms. Similarly, risk of food shortage is not an ex-ante condition; it is rather the outcome 
of the hazard (risky event) and an individual’s or household's vulnerability to that hazard. It is important 
to note, however, that these nuances are a question of semantics rather than actual differences in 
conceptual meaning. 
xiii The aim of the Social Risk Management approach is to embed social protection programs into an 
integrated approach to poverty reduction. To this extent, the SRM framework is considered as a safety net 
in times of crisis and hardship, but more importantly a springboard to assist the poor to escape poverty 
and vulnerability prior to the occurrence of a shock (World Bank, 2000). 
xiv They can be characterized by a known or unknown probability distribution, by different magnitude 
(size and spread), history, frequency, correlation, duration, timing and severity. They may be 
idiosyncratic (i.e. specific to the household and its members, e.g. illness or job loss), or covariate (i.e. 
experienced simultaneously, regionally or nationally, e.g. inflation, recession, and terms-of-trade 
volatility).
 
xv Households can respond to or manage risks in several ways, using formal and informal risk managing, 
mitigating and coping tools. Risk management involves ex-ante and ex-post actions. Risk mitigation 
includes formal and informal responses to expected losses such as self-insurance (e.g. precautionary 
savings), building social networks, and formal insurance based on expansion of the risk pool. Risk coping 
activities are ex post responses and involve activities to deal with actual losses such as selling assets, 
removing children from school, migration of selected family members, taking temporary employment. 
The availability of coping mechanisms has to be coupled with the degree of “adaptability” or “resilience” 
of different households. The two concepts, although, interconnected present slight differences.
 
xvi Standard analyses generally use a poverty line to assess “vulnerability to poverty”. 
xvii  Efforts have been made to combine the “sustainable livelihood” approach and “environmental 
vulnerability”, where vulnerability is the exposure of individuals or social groups to a reduction in 
livelihood linked to environmental change (Dinar & al., 1998, Ahmed & Lipton, 1999). Following this 
approach, methodologies to provide insights into the expected negative impacts of climate change have 
been developed. However, we should remember the distinction between “socio-economic vulnerability” 
and “ecological fragility or environmental vulnerability” (Guillamont, 2007). While socio-economic 
vulnerability can be induced also by natural factors (see, e.g., the undeniably negative impact of 
earthquakes, typhoons and floods on the sustainability of economic growth), we need to acknowledge 
that an entire set of issues, such as biodiversity, pollution and global warming, remain exclusively outside 
this subject and form a separate and specific area of analysis, i.e. “ecological fragility”. 
















, where q is the number of poor and n the number of the whole population; z is the 34 
 
                                                                                                                                               
poverty line and  i y is the income of poor household i.  The FGT index defines poverty as the normalized 
weighted sum of the gap between income and the poverty line, where weights are the same distances 
from  the  poverty  line.  The  parameter  α  sets  the  degree  of  sensitivity  of  the poverty measure to the 
distance from the poverty line. It takes the values 0 for the headcount poverty measure, 1 for the poverty 
gap (i.e. the depth of poverty) and 2 for the squared poverty gap (i.e. the severity of poverty). 
xix To overcome this problem, Kamanou & Morduch (2002) express vulnerability as expected changes in 
poverty rather than expected poverty per se. Specifically, they define vulnerability in a population as the 
difference between the expected value of a poverty measure in the future and its current value (i.e. only 
the first moment matters), attaching weights to the deviations between the welfare measure and its 
benchmark. This measure of vulnerability is similar to a measure of the incidence or severity of poverty. 
xx  A three-step feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) is applied by Chaudhuri (2001, 2003) to 
overcome the problem of heteroschedasticity.  
xxi Actually, if markets are not complete and the random walk hypothesis for consumption does not hold, 
consumption is not expected to follow a stationary process due to a multiplicity of factors (preferences, 
demographics, liquidity constraints, etc.) and we need to rely on a lifecycle model. 
xxii To make this point Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003) present the following example: consider two 
possible scenarios. In the first, a risk averse household is certain that expected consumption in period t+1 
is just below the poverty line so that the probability of poverty (i.e. vulnerability) is 1. In the second, 
while mean expected consumption remains unchanged, there is a slight variability of consumption such 
that there is probability 0.5 that the household will have consumption just above the mean (and above the 
poverty line) and probability 0.5 that the household will have consumption slightly lower than the mean 
(and the poverty line). Moving from the first scenario to the second, makes the household worse off 
(being risk averse, it would prefer the certain consumption to the expected consumption). However, the 
second scenario will reduce vulnerability, from 1 to 0.5. The perverse result is that, using this measure, a 
policymaker seeking to reduce vulnerability should introduce new sources of risks. 
xxiii Acknowledging the latter caveat, Günther & Harttgen (2006, 2009) and Sarris & Karfakis (2006) 
present a method to assess vulnerability using a single round of cross-sectional data, but differentiating 
the relative importance of covariate shocks at the “community level” with idiosyncratic ones at household 
level.  
xxiv This is accomplished simply by setting z equal to expected per capita consumption expenditures 
(Ligon & Schechter, 2004). To operationalize the idea, we let c denote per capita expenditure. In fact, if 
every household definitely consumes c, then there is no vulnerability - no risk and no inequality (and 
hence no relative poverty). Then the vulnerability of household i  could be defined as: 
) ( ) ( h h h h c EU c U V − =  
xxv This decomposition is not peculiar to utility based measures of vulnerability.
 
xxvi The concavity of utility implies that as the expected consumption approaches the poverty line an 
additional unit of expected consumption diminishes the marginal value in reducing poverty. 
xxvii It is the “natural” counterpart, denominated in utils, of the “risk premium” the household would be 
willing to forego in order to eliminate the risk. It can be measured, starting from a (weakly) concave 
utility function, as the difference between the utility of consuming the expected consumption with 
certainty and the expected utility from consuming ch, written as UhE(ch)-EUh(ch)=ρ.  
xxviii However, they differ in what the welfare indicator is: FGT poverty measures in VEP, CES utility 
function in VEU, rate of coverage of basic needs in VFP.
 
xxix Ligon & Schechter (2004) highlight that only the second step actually measures vulnerability. 
xxx Indeed, in the case of the VFP approach, a set of additional axioms and a slight modification to the 
aforementioned ones are  required. For a detailed explanation of the measurement of VFP aggregate 
vulnerability as a convenient combination of individual levels, see Calvo & Dercon (2007). 
xxxi They actually tried also to mix-and-match estimators and measures.
 
xxxii Chaudhuri (2001)’s estimator takes advantage of information on the variance of residuals to improve 
efficiency, such as Generalized Least Squares improves on OLS.
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xxxiii Comparing 13 panel studies of developing countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Russia, 
Baulch & Hoddinot (2000) show there is a surprisingly large percentage of temporarily poor households 
(from a low of 20% to a high of 66%) in relation to the percentage of chronically poor (10% on average, 
but never more than 25%) for each region. 
xxxiv.The poor are said to be especially devastated by economic crises, as they are covariant and 
generally catastrophic in nature. They represent great sources of vulnerability and insecurity for present 
and future generations alike. They wreak irreversible and unrecoverable damage and loss on human 
capital through a chain of events, beginning with economic crisis and ending with loss of income and 
selling off of assets at depressed prices. The upshot is a general slow-down in the accumulation of 
human, financial and physical capital, making escape from poverty that much farther from reach. 
xxxv  The largest relative differences in the incidence of shocks seem to occur across location 
characteristics, such as the region or area of residence. 
xxxvi Consumption or income in the absence of a shock was estimated by setting all shock variables to 0. 
Thus, counterfactual consumption will be the familiar consumption function found in most cross-
sectional poverty studies, while the impact of a shock will be the difference between the predicted 
consumption level and the part of the actual consumption positively correlated with the observed shock. 
Unfortunately, in this model the estimated parameters seem not to be resistant to alternative 
specifications of the functional form. Moreover, simple specifications of the consumption or income 
regression with shock dummies tend to emphasize the positive impact for some shocks. 
xxxvii  The Oaxaca (1973) decomposition provides separate consumption estimations for a sample of 
households with and without shocks, and a way of partitioning the gap into a part attributable to 
differences in measured characteristics and a part attributable to the “treatment”. This approach helps to 
explain the average differences between the two groups,  but is not very helpful for understanding the 
distributional consequences of shocks. 
xxxviii  Di Nardo &  al. (1996)
  provide an extension of the Oaxaca decomposition by estimating the 
distribution of consumption that would have prevailed if all households were spared the negative impact 
of shocks, giving more weight to those households who are more likely to be under-represented. This 
distribution is compared with the actual distribution of consumption, and for each bin of the distribution 
the impact of the shock is determined as the difference between the current and the counterfactual 
density. For more details, see Tesliuc & Lindert (2004).  
xxxix  This issue must be separated from the issue of Small Islands Development States (SIDS) and 
“Fragile States”. SIDS are states characterized by a “natural and/or endogenous inability to face external 
shocks” (Montalbano & Triulzi, 2009; UNU-WIDER, 2008; Briguglio 1995; Atkins & Mazzi, 1999; 
Easterly  &  Kraay, 1999; Briguglio  &  Galea, 2003; Winters  &  Martins, 2004; Witter, Briguglio, & 
Bhuglah, 2002; Briguglio & al., 2009). A presumptive “special status” of SIDS was granted at the first 
Global Conference on Sustainable Development of SIDS in Barbados in April 1994. It highlights the 
special situation of SIDS in terms of vulnerability calling for distinctive policy approaches to effectively 
address their sustainable development problems. However, they are largely an informal group, formed in 
85% of cases by medium-high income countries. Fragile states are countries whose policy and 
institutional assessment, essentially the World Bank’s country policy and institutional assessment 
(CPIA), falls below a particular threshold. Of course, many countries may meet both criteria of structural 
vulnerability as well as state fragility, owing to the likely influence of the former on the latter, but the two 
concepts are founded on opposite grounds, structural versus policy factors, and cannot be used in the 
same way to design international policies, as we see below in the case of aid policies (Guillaumont, 
2009). More specifically, a state is classified as fragile if government does not deliver core functions to 
the majority of its people, including the poor. A number of post-conflict states fall into this category 
(UNU-WIDER 2008). 
xl Regarding the trade and volatility link, e.g., extensive use of “panel data” is made to measure the 
“external exposure” of a worldwide sample of countries by the sensitivity of first and second moments of 
economic growth (average rate and standard deviation) to openness and financial shocks (Kose & al., 
2003; Hnatkovska & Loayza, 2004; Wolf, 2004a; Calderòn & al., 2005). Semi-structural VAR (Vector 36 
 
                                                                                                                                               
AutoRegressive Models) are applied to panel data in order to isolate and standardize shocks; estimate 
their impact on GDP and examine whether and to what extent this impact depends on domestic 
conditions (Loayza & Raddatz, 2007; Santos-Paolino 2007). Malik & Temple (2006), in their effort to 
explain differences in output volatility across developing countries, used instead a Bayesian method to 
highlight explanatory variables that are robust across a wide range of specifications. Another interesting 
exercise to measure variability is proposed in Valenzuela (2006), which attempts to assess whether, in a 
context of volatile commodity markets, it is possible to discern the effects of trade liberalization on 
poverty using an innovative application of a stochastic framework in combination with the Global CGE 
model and a micro-household simulation. An extensive use of Probit models is applied to measure the 
probability of a sudden stop (Cavallo & Frankel, 2008; Calvo & al., 2003, Frankel & Rose, 1996, Frankel 
& Wei , 2004, Glick & Rose 1999). 
xli Although some of these crises received considerable attention in the media (Mexico 1995, Southeast 
Asia 1997, Brazil and Russia 1998, and Argentina 2001), as World Bank (2000) points out, they 
represent merely the tip of the iceberg that is a much vaster and more complex phenomenon. 
xlii CMEA was established in 1949 with the aim of encouraging economic, scientific and technological 
cooperation and developing economic integration among Socialist member countries which included 
USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Albania (1949); DDR (1950), Mongolia 
(1962); Cuba (1972) and Vietnam (1978). 
xliii They apply a multinomial logit (MNL) model to analyze the probability of being in a particular state, 


















where k is the number of outcomes being modelled. This, in general terms, expresses the probability that 
an individual with characteristics xi chooses the jth category.    
xliv Using the squared residuals, Günther & Harttgen (2009) estimate the variance at household and 
community levels, depending on a set of observable characteristics at household and community level. 
xlv If trade opening also increases the elasticity of labor demand, then not only output, but also wages and 
employment are more volatile in the presence of shocks. 
References 
Acemoglu, D., S., Johnson, J., Robinson, & Y., Thaicharoen (2003). Institutional causes, macroeconomic 
symptoms: volatility, crises and growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 5(1): 49-123. 
Agenor, P. R., C. J., McDermott, & E. S., Prasad (2000). Macroeconomic fluctuations in developing 
countries: some stylized facts. World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 251-285. 
Ahmed I.I., & Lipton, M. (1999). Impact of structural adjustment on sustainable rural livelihoods: a 
review of the literature. IDS Working Paper 62, Sussex: Institute for Development Studies (IDS). 
Aizenman, J., & B. Pinto (eds) (2004). Managing volatility and crises: a practitioner’s guide. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Alwang, J., P. B., Siegel, & S. L., Jorgensen (2001). Vulnerability: a view from different disciplines. 
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No.0015, World Bank. 
Amin, S., A.S., Rai, & G., Topa (1999). Does Microcredit Reach the Poor and Vulnerable? Evidence 
from Northern Bangladesh. CID Working Paper No.28, Cambridge MA: Center for International 
Development, Harvard University. 
Anderson,  H.,  Kwark, N.S., & F., Vashid (1999). Does International Trade Synchronize Business 
Cycles? Texas: Manuscript, Monash University and Texas A&M University. 
Atkins, J.P., & S., Mazzi (1999). Small States: A Composite Vulnerability Index.  Washington DC: 
Advisory Board to the Joint Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Task Force on Small States, 
World Bank. 37 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Baulch, B., & J., Hoddinott (2000). Economic Mobility and Poverty Dynamics in Developing Countries. 
Journal of Development Studies, 36(6), 1–24. 
Barrientos, A. (2007). Does vulnerability create poverty traps? CPRC Working Paper No. 76, Sussex: 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS), May. 
Baxter, M., & Kouparitsas, M. (2004). Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement: A Robust Analysis. 
NBER Working Paper  No  10725,  Cambridge, United States: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Briguglio, L., (1995). Small island developing states and their economic vulnerabilities.  World 
Development, 23(9), 1615-1632. 
Briguglio, L., & Galea, W. (2003). Updating the Economic Vulnerability Index. Occasional Papers on 
Islands and Small States. 
Briguglio, L., G., Cordina, N., Farrugia, & Vella, S. (2009). Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: 
Concepts and Measurements. Oxford Development Studies, 37:3, 229-247. 
Calderòn, C. A., A. E., Chong, & E. H., Stein (2002). Trade intensity and business cycle synchronization: 
are developing countries any different?  Washington DC: Manuscript, Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
Calderòn, C. A., N., Loayza, & K., Schmidt-Hebbel (2005). Does openness imply greater exposure? 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3733, World Bank. 
Calvo, C., & S., Dercon (2003). Vulnerability: an axiomatic approach. Oxford: Mimeo, Department of 
Economics, University of Oxford. 
Calvo, C., & Dercon, S. (2005). Measuring individual vulnerability. Discussion paper no. 229. Oxford: 
University of Oxford.  
Calvo, C. & S., Dercon (2007). Vulnerability to poverty, CSAE WPS, 2007-03, Oxford: University of 
Oxford. 
Calvo, G.A., A., Izquierdo & L.F., Mejía. (2003). On the empirics of sudden stops. NBER Working Paper 
No 10520. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Canova, F., & H., Dellas, (1993). Trade interdependence and the international business cycle, Journal of 
International Economics 34, 23–47. 
Carney, D.  (1999).  Livelihoods approaches compared.  London: Department for International 
Development. 
Carroll, C.D. (2001). A theory of the consumption function with and without liquidity constraints. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15( 3), 23-45. 
Carter, M.R., & C.B., Barrett (2006). The economics of poverty traps and persistent poverty: an asset-
based approach. Journal of Development Studies, 42 (2),178-99. 
Carter, M. R., P.D., Little, T., Mogues, & W., Negatu (2007). Poverty traps and the long-term 
consequences of natural disasters in Ethiopia and Honduras. World Development, 35 (5), 835-856. 
Cavallo, E.A.  (2007).  Output volatility and openness to trade: a reassessment. Washington (DC): 
Mimeo. Inter-American Development Bank. 
Cavallo, E.A., & Frankel., J.A. (2008). Does openness to trade make countries more vulnerable to sudden 
stops, or less? using gravity to establish causality. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
27(8), 1430-1452.  
Chaudhuri, S. (2001). Empirical methods for assessing household vulnerability to poverty, unpublished 
manuscript. 
Chaudhuri, S. (2003) Assessing vulnerability to poverty: concepts, empirical methods and illustrative 
examples, New York: Mimeo, Department of Economics, Columbia University. 
Chaudhuri,  S.,  & G., Datt (2001) Assessing household vulnerability to poverty: a methodology and 
estimates for the Philippines, Washington (DC): Mimeo, World Bank. 
Chaudhuri, S., J.,  Jalan, & A., Suryahadi (2002). Assessing household vulnerability to poverty from 
cross-sectional data: a methodology and estimates from Indonesia.  New York:  Mimeo, 
Department of Economics, Columbia University. 
Christiaensen, L.J., & R.N., Boisvert (2000). On measuring household food vulnerability: case evidence 
from northern Mali, Ithaca NY: Mimeo, Department of Agricultural. Resource and Managerial 
Economics, Cornell University.  38 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Christiaensen, L. & K., Subbarao (2001). Towards an understanding of vulnerability in rural Kenya, 
Washington (DC): Mimeo, World Bank.  
Clark, T. E., &  van Wincoop, E., (2001). Borders and business cycles.  Journal of International 
Economics, 55, 59–85. 
Cline, W. R (2004).  Trade policy and global poverty. Washington (DC): Institute of International 
Economics.  
Corsetti, G., P., Pesenti, N., Rubini, & C., Tille (2000). Competitive devaluations: a welfare based 
approach,  NBER Working Paper No.  6889, Cambridge MA:  National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Dehn, J. (2000). The effects on growth of commodity price uncertainty and shocks. Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2455, World Bank. 
Dercon,  S. (2001).  Assessing Vulnerability to Poverty,  Oxford: Mimeo, Jesus College and  CSAE, 
Department of Economics, Oxford University. 
Dercon, S., & P., Krishnan (2000). Vulnerability,  seasonality and poverty in Ethiopia.  Journal of 
Development Studies, 36 (6): 25-53. 
Datt, G., & H., Hoogeveen (2000). El Nino or El Peso? crisis, poverty and income distribution in the 
Philippines. World Development, 31(7), 1103-1124. 
di Giovanni, J., & A.A,. Levchenko (2006).  Openness,  volatility and the risk content of exports. 
Washington (DC): Mimeo, International Monetary Fund. 
Dinar, A., & al. (1998). Measuring the impact of climate change on Indian agriculture. World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 402, Washington (DC): World Bank.  
Dynan, K. E., (1993), How prudent are consumers? Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), 1104-1113. 
Di Nardo, J., N., Fortin, T., Lemieux (1996). Labor market institutions and the distribution of wages, 
1973-1992: a semiparametric approach. Econometrica, 64(5), 1001-44. 
Dollar, D., & A., Kraay (2001). Growth is good for the poor. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2587, World Bank.  
Dollar, D., & A., Kraay (2002). Trade, growth, and poverty. Economic Journal, 114 (493), F22-F49. 
Dornbusch, R., I., Goldfajn, & R., Valdés (1995). Currency crises and collapses. Brooking Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2, 219-293. 
Easterly, W., M., Kremer, L., Pritchett, & L. Summers (1993). Good policy or good luck?: country 
growth performance and temporary shocks. Journal of Monetary Economics 32(3), 459-483. 
Easterly, W.R., & A., Kraay (1999). Small States. Small Problems?  World Bank Policy Research 
Department Working Paper No.2139, World Bank. 
Easterly, W.R., R., Islam, & J.E., Stiglitz (2001). Shaken and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility. In 
Pleskovic  B. & N., Stern (eds)  Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 2000, 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 191-211. 
Edwards, S. (1993). Openness,  trade liberalisation and growth in developing countries.  Journal of 
Economic Literature, 31, 1358-93. 
Edwards, S. (2004). Financial openness, sudden stops and current account reversals. American Economic 
Review, 94(2), 59-64. 
Eichengreen, B., & Rose, A.K., (1999). Contagious currency crises: channels of conveyance . In Ito, T., 
& A., Krueger (eds.) Changes in exchange rates in rapidly developing countries theory, practice, 
and policy issues.  NBER-East Asia Seminar on Economics,  7, Chicago (USA): Chicago 
University Press, 29–55. 
Fatás, A. (2000) Do business cycles cast long shadows? short-run persistence and economic growth. 
Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 147–162. 
Fatás, A., & I., Mihov (2003). The case for restricting fiscal policy discretion. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118(4), 1419-1447.  
Fatás, A., & I., Mihov (2005). Policy Volatility, Institutions and Economic Growth. CEPR Discussion 
Paper No 5388.  
Federici,  A.,  & P., Montalbano (2010).  Assessing vulnerability to trade openness: a cross-country 
comparison. Working paper No 3/10, Rome (Italy): Department of Economic Theory, Sapienza 
University. 39 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Forbes, K. (2001). Are trade linkages important determinants of country vulnerability to crises? NBER 
Working Paper No.8194, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Foster, J., J. ,Greer, & E., Thorbecke (1984). A class of decomposable poverty measures. Econometrica, 
52 (3), 761-766. 
Frankel, A.J., & D., Romer (1999). Does trade cause growth? The American Economic Review, 89 (3), 
379-99. 
Frankel, J.A., &  A.K., Rose (1996). Currency crashes in emerging markets: an empirical treatment. 
Journal of International Economics, 41, 351-368. 
Frankel, J.A., & S.J., Wei (2004). Managing macroeconomic crises: policy lessons. In Aizenman, J., & 
B.,  Pinto (eds) (2004).  Managing  volatility and crises: a practitioner’s guide.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gavin, M., & R., Hausmann (1996). Sources of macroeconomic volatility in developing economies, 
Washington (DC): Mimeo, Inter-American Development Bank. 
Gilchrist, S., & C., Himmelberg (1998). Investment, fundamentals and finance. NBER Working Paper 
No. 6652, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Glewwe, P., & G., Hall (1998). Are some groups more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks than others? 
Hypothesis tests based on panel data from Peru. Journal of Development Economics, 56(1), 181-
206. 
Glewwe P., M. Gragnolati, & H., Zaman (2000). Who gained from Vietnam’s boom in the 1990s? An 
analysis of poverty and inequality trends. Policy Research Working Paper No 2275, World Bank. 
Glick, R., & A., Rose (1999). Contagion and trade. why are currency crises regional.  Journal  of 
International Money and Finance, 18(4), 630-17. 
Goldberg, P. K., & N., Pavcnik (2004). Trade, inequality, and poverty: what do we know? Evidence from 
recent trade liberalization episodes in developing countries. Brookings Trade Forum, 223-269. 
Goldstein, H. (1999). Multilevel statistical models. London: Arnold. 
Grossmann, G.M., & E., Helpmann (1991). Innovation and growth in the global economy. Cambridge 
MA: The MIT Press. 
Guidotti, P., F., Sturzenegger & A. Villar, (2004).On the consequences of sudden stops. Economía 4(2), 
1-44.  
Guillaumont P., (2007). Assessing the economic vulnerability of small island developing states and the 
least developed countries. UNU-WIDER, Research Paper No. 2007/40. 
Guillaumont P., (2009). An economic vulnerability index: its design and use for international 
development policy states and the least developed countries. Oxford Development Studies, 37(3), 
193-228. 
Günther, I., & K., Harttgen (2009). Estimating households vulnerability to idiosyncratic and covariate 
shocks: a novel method applied in Madagascar. World Development, 37(7), 1222-1234. 
Heitzmann, K., Canagarajah, R., Siegel, P.B. (2001). Rationale and guideline for a risk and vulnerability 
assessment. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No 0218, World Bank. 
Hnatkovska, V., & N., Loayza (2004). Volatility and growth. World Bank Policy Research Department 
Working Paper No 3184, World Bank.  
Hoddinott, J., &  A., Quisumbing (2003). Methods for microeconometric risk and vulnerability 
assessments. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No 0324, World Bank. 
Holzmann, R. (2001), Risk and vulnerability:  the forward looking role of social protection in a 
globalizing world. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0109, World Bank. 
Holzmann, R., S., Jørgensen (2001). Social risk management: a new conceptual framework for social 
protection and beyond. International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 525-552. 
Imbs, J. (2004). Trade, finance, specialization, and synchronization. Review of Economics and Statistics. 
86(3), 723-734. 
Jalan, J., & M., Ravallion (1999). Are the poor less well insured? evidence on vulnerability to income 
risk in rural China. Journal of Development Economics, 58, 61-81.  
Justino, P., & J., Litchfield (2002). Poverty dynamics in Vietnam: winners and losers during reform. 
PRUS WP 10, Sussex: University of Sussex. 40 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Kamanou, G., & J., Morduch (2002). Measuring vulnerability to poverty. NYU Wagner Working Paper 
No 1012, New York: New York University. 
Karras, G., & F., Song (1996). Sources of business-cycle volatility: An exploratory study on a sample of 
OECD countries. Journal of Macroeconomics. 18(4), 621-37. 
Koren, M., & S., Tenreyro (2007). Volatility and development. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (1), 
243-87.  
Koren, M., & S., Tenreyro (2008) Technological Diversification. Mimeo, Central European University 
and London School of Economics.  
Kose, M. A. (2002). Explaining business cycles in small open economies, How much do world prices 
matter? Journal of International Economics, 56, 299-327. 
Kose, M. A., & K. M., Yi (2001). International trade and business cycles: Is vertical specialization the 
missing link? The American Economic Review, 91(2), 371. 
Kose,  M.  A.,  &  K.  M.,  Yi (2006).  Can the standard international business cycle model explain the 
relation between trade and comovement? Journal of International Economics, 68, 267-295. 
Kose, M. A., E. S., Prasad & M. E., Terrones (2003). Financial integration and macroeconomic volatility. 
IMF Staff Papers, 50, Special Issue. 
Kose, M. A., E. S., Prasad & M. E., Terrones (2005). Growth and volatility in an era of globalization, 
IMF Staff Papers, 52, Special Issue. 
Kraay, A., & J., Ventura (2007). Comparative advantage and the cross-section of business cycles. 
Journal of European Economic Association, 5(6), 1300-1333.  
Krishna, P., & A. A., Levchenko (2009). Comparative advantage, complexity, and volatility. NBER 
Working Paper No. 14965, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Lee, J. J., & Y. Sawada (2010). Precautionary saving under liquidity constraints: evidence from rural 
Pakistan. Journal of Development Economics, 91, 77–86. 
Ligon, E., & L., Schechter (2003). Measuring vulnerability. Economic Journal, 113 (486), C95-102. 
Ligon, E., & L., Schechter (2004). Evaluating different approaches to estimating vulnerability. Social 
Protection Discussion Paper 0210, World Bank, Washington, DC.  
Loayza, N.V, & C., Raddatz  (2007). The structural determinants of external vulnerability.  The World 
Bank Economic Review, 21(3), 359-387. 
Lundberg, M., & L., Squire (2003). The simultaneous evolution of growth and inequality. Economic 
Journal, 113(487), 326-344. 
Martin, P., & H., Rey (2006).  Globalization and emerging markets: with or without crash?. American 
Economic Review 96(5), 1631-1651. 
Malik,  A.,  & J.R.W., Temple (2009).  The geography of output volatility.  Journal of Development 
Economics, 90 (2), 163-178. 
McCulloch, N., L. A., Winters, & X., Cirera (2001). Trade liberalization and poverty: a handbook.  
London, Centre of Economic Policy Research. 
Mendoza, E. G. (1995).  The terms of trade, the real exchange rate and economic fluctuations. 
International Economic Review, 36 (1), 101–37. 
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., & A., Razin (1998). Sharp reductions in current account deficits: an empirical 
analysis. European Economic Review 42 (3-5): 897-908. 
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., &  A., Razin (2000). Current account reversals and currency crises: empirical 
regularities. In  P.Krugman, editor.,  Currency Crises. Chicago, United States: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Montalbano, P., & U., Triulzi (2002). Towards socio-economic vulnerability analysis: integrating 
conflict analysis into development programmes and strategies. Paris, DAC Network on Conflict, 
Peace and Development Co-operation, DCD/DAC/CPDC 3. 
Montalbano, P., Muzi, S., Federici, A., & U., Triulzi (2005). Risk and vulnerability assessments, from a 
macro to a meso approach: the case of Morocco. Paper presented at the 12
th Annual Conference 
of the Economic Research Forum (ERF), December. Cairo, Egypt. 
Montalbano, P., Federici, A., Pietrobelli C., & U., Triulzi (2006). Trade openness and vulnerability in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In M., Nissanke, & E., Thorbecke (eds), The impact of globalization 
on the world’s poor: transmission mechanisms.  Palgrave Macmillan. 41 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Montalbano, P., Federici, A., Pietrobelli, C., & U., Triulzi (2008). Socio-economic vulnerability and 
trade liberalization: a cross-country evidence in Central and Eastern Europe during the transition.  
In L. Squire, & J. M., Fanelli (eds.), Dimensions of Reform: Reach, Range, Reason. Northampton, 
MA:  Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Montalbano, P., & U., Triulzi (2009). Assessing SIDS’ vulnerability to trade openness. GDN WP series, 
forthcoming.  
Morduch, J. (1994). Poverty and vulnerability. American Economic Review, 84, 221-25. 
Naudé, W., M., McGillivray, & S., Rossouw (2009). Measuring the Vulnerability of Subnational Regions 
in South Africa, Oxford Development Studies, 37:3,249-276. 
Naudé, W., A. Santos-Paulino, & M., McGillivray (eds) (2009a), Vulnerability in developing countries, 
UNU-WIDER, Tokyo and New York: UNU Press.  
Naudé, W., Santos-Paulino, A., & M., McGillivray (2009b). Measuring vulnerability: an overview and 
introduction. Oxford Development Studies, 37(3),183-191. 
Niimi, Y, Dutta,  P.V., &  L. A., Winters (2007). Trade liberalisation and poverty dynamics in Vietnam. 
Journal of Economic Integration, 22 (4), 819-851. 
Oaxaca, R. (1973).  Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets.  International  Economic 
Review, 14(3), 693-709. 
Otto, G., Voss, G., Willard, L. (2001). Understanding OECD output correlations,  Discussion Paper 
2001-05. Reserve Bank of Australia Research. 
Pallage, S., & M. A., Robe (2003) On the welfare cost of economic fluctuations in developing countries. 
International Economic Review, 44(2), 2003. 
Prasad, E. S. , & J. A., Gable (1998). International Evidence on the Determinants of Trade Dynamics, 
IMF Staff Papers, 45 (3). 
Pritchett, L., Sumarto, S., & A., Suryahadi (2000). Quantifying vulnerability to poverty: a proposed 
measure with application to Indonesia, World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper 
No.2437. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Raddatz,  C. (2007).  Are external shocks responsible for the instability of output in low-income 
countries?, Journal of Development Economics, 84 (1), 155-187. 
Ramey, G., & V., Ramey (1995). Cross-country evidence on the link between volatility and growth. 
American Economic Review, 85(5), 1138-51. 
Razin, A., Sadka, E., & T.,  Coury (2003). Trade openness, investment instability and terms-of-trade 
volatility. Journal of International Economics, 61, 285-306. 
Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments?.  Journal of Political 
Economy, 106 (5), 997-1032. 
Rodrik, D. (1999). Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflict, and growth collapses. 
Journal of Economic Growth, 4(4), 385-412.  
Rothschild, M., & J.E., Stiglitz (1970). Increasing risk: a definition. Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 225–
243. 
Rose, A. (2005).  A reason why countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade. Journal 
of Development Economics, 77(1), 189-206.  
Rosenzweig, M.,  &  K.,  Wolpin (1993).Credit  market  constraints, consumption smoothing, and the 
accumulation of durable production assets in low-income countries: investments in bullocks in 
India. Journal of Political Economy, 101, 223-244 
Sachs, J.D., & A.M., Warner (1995). Economic reform and the process of global integration.  Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1–95. 
Sarris, A., &  P., Karfakis, (2006). Household vulnerability in rural Tanzania, Paper presented at the 
CSAE Conference 2006: “Reducing Poverty and Inequality: How can Africa be included?”, 19-21 
March 2006; Oxford, UK. 
Santos-Paolino, A.U. (2007). Terms of trade shocks and the current account in Small Island States. 
UNU-WIDER Research Paper No. 2007/20.  
Singh, N. &  J.,  Gilman  (1999).  Making  livelihoods more sustainable.  International  Social Science 
Journal, 162, 539-545. 
Stadler, G.W. (1994). Real business cycles. Journal of Economics Literature, Vol. XXXII, 1750-1783. 42 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Tesliuc, E., & K., Lindert (2004). Risk and vulnerability in Guatemala: a quantitative and qualitative 
assessment. Social Protection Discussion Paper 0404. Washington: World Bank. 
Townsend, R. (1994). Risk and insurance in village india. Econometrica, 62(3), 539-91. 
Townsend, R. (1995). Consumption insurance: an evaluation of risk-bearing systems in low-income 
economies. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(3), 83-102. 
UN/ISDR (2004).  Living with risk: a global review of disaster reduction initiatives.  Inter-Agency 
Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-lwr-2004-eng.htm  
UNU-WIDER (2008). Fragility States. Research Brief, 3.  
UNDP (1999). Sustainable livelihoods: concepts, principles and approaches to indicator development. 
New York. 
UNDP (2000), Section I: participatory assessment and planning for sustainable livelihoods, draft No. 1, 
Social Development and Poverty Elimination Division (SEPED/BDP), Working Paper.  
Valenzuela, E. (2006). Poverty, vulnerability and trade policy in general equilibrium. PhD dissertation. 
Purdue University, West Lafayette. 
Wincoop, E., & K. Yi (2000). Asia crisis post-mortem: where did the money go and did the United States 
benefit?. Economic Policy Review, 51-70. 
Winters, A.L. (2002). Trade liberalisation and poverty: what are the links?. The World Economy, 25 (9), 
1339-1367. 
Winters, A.L. (2004).  Trade liberalisation and economic performance: an overview.  The Economic 
Journal, 114, F4-F21. 
Winters, L.A., & P., Martins (2004). Beautiful but costly: business costs in small remote economies. 
London, Commonwealth Secretariat  www.sidsnet.org.  
Winters, L. A., McCulloch N., & A. McKay (2004). Trade liberalization and poverty: the evidence so far. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 42 (1), 72-115. 
Witter, M., Briguglio, L. & A., Bhuglah (2002).  Measuring and managing the economic vulnerability  of 
Small Island Developing States. Paper presented at the Global Roundtable on Vulnerability and 
Small Island Developing States: Exploring Mechanisms for Partnerships, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 
9-10 May   http://www.undp.org/capacity21/docs/Econ-Vulnerability-Paper.doc 
Wolf, H. (2004a). Accounting for consumption volatility differences. IMF Staff Papers No.50, Special 
Issue, International Monetary Fund: Washington DC. 
Wolf, H. (2004b). Volatility: definitions and consequences. In Aizenman, J. and B. Pinto (eds), 
Managing volatility and crises: a practitioner’s guide.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
World Bank (2000).  Attacking poverty.  World Development  Report 2000/2001, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Zimmerman, F. J., & M.R., Carter (2003). Asset smoothing, consumption  smoothing and the 
reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints.  Journal of Development 
Economics, 71 (2), 233-60. 
 